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Turning Back the Clock on Sexual Abuse of Children:
Amending Virginia's Statute of Limitations
by Paul A. Lombardo, Ph.D., J.D.
Numerous verified reports of child sexual abuse
have combined with the growing literature on that
topic to call into question awell-worn Freudian myth.
Women's reports of childhood sexual activity with
their fathers or other men are no longer assumed to be
the products of fantasy nor artifacts of wish-fulfill-
ment and over-active feminine imaginations. Con-
crete evidence of the incidence of child sexual abuse-
-of males and females--no longer permits such charges
to be dismissed without serious investigation. '
Increasing popular and professional attention
has forced the sexual abuse of children out of the
psychic closet and into public view. With increased
attention has come vigorous advocacy for "survi-
vors" of abuse. Step-by-step guides for bringing
lawsuits against sexual abuse perpetrators have been
published. 2 Proposals have appeared to hypnotize
witnesses and unearth
childhood memories for
use as evidence in civil
trials. '
Advocates for the
accused have also spo-
ken out. Some, con-
cerned about the poten-
tial for unsubstantiated
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claims, focus upon the rights of those charged with
being abusers. Fabrication of an abuse charge for
"leverage" during a child custody case has been
explored in the legal literature. I A number of
prominent mental health professionals have formed
the False Memory Syndrome Foundation. The
foundation's mission includes efforts to study and
combat what is described as "enormous family suf-
fering" caused by misguided programs of therapy
during which patients "come to believe that they
suffer from 'repressed memories' of incest and sexual
abuse." I The potential for false accusation remains
a serious consideration both for the therapeutic com-
munity and for those who would fashion legal policy.
Thus, adult survivors of the trauma of sexual
abuse who choose to reveal the secrets of a lifetime
may confront not only professionals who doubt them
but also a skeptical pub-
lic, whose attitudes con-
cerningintrafamilialpri-
vacy and publicized
shame have changed
slowly, if at all. Equally
troublesome for those
bold enough to unmask
their assailants is a legal
system unprepared to ad-
dress allegations of
harms long past, accus-
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tomed instead to a counsel of indifference toward
claims so difficult to substantiate.
The first announced survivors of childhood
sexual abuse transcended the traditional reticence to
report past victimization. They coupled public accu-
sations with claims for financial damages to compen-
sate for years of shame, guilt, emotional pain and the
cost of therapy to treat those feelings. But lawsuits
between survivors of childhood sexual abuse and
their abusers were blocked by legal, as well as
attitudinal hurdles. For many adults who had suf-
fered abuse decades earlier, the time frame in which
suits could be brought had already passed. Their
claims were barred from court by statutes of limita-
tion.
Prior to 1991, Virginia's law reflected a com-
mon limitation period for personal injury litigation.
People claiming damages had to initiate lawsuits
within two years after an injurywas sustained.' If the
victim was a child at the time of the injury, the statute
of limitations was "tolled" or held in abeyance until
the child became an adult. Since the age of majority
in Virginia is eighteen, a victim of personal injury
(including sexual abuse) could wait no longer than
the twentieth birthday to pursue a claim in court.
Those who delayed forfeited the right to sue.
Statutes of Limitation
A statute of limitation forms chronological
brackets around an injury that could lead to a lawsuit
and the time when the suit must be filed. The injury
gives rise to a legal "cause of action" and marks the
first temporal point when a victim has a claim for
damages, and thus the first time a suit would be
justified. In most personal injury lawsuits, the cause
of action is said to "accrue" when an intentional or
negligent and wrongful act has occurred and an injury
is sustained. The lawsuit for damages is the remedy
for the injury. The purpose of the limitation period
is to rule out "stale" legal claims, and bring some
finality to interpersonal transactions.7 Litigants who
fail to pursue legal remedies within the limitation
period are said to have "slept on their rights."
Statutes of limitation aid social stability by
foreclosing disputes about events in the distant past.
They also reflect the recognition that even if time
does not heal all wounds, it does dull most memories.
Witnesses die or move to other places, recollections
fade, and physical evidence that might be necessary
to prove a case in court tends to disappear. The
possibility of reliably proving fault, causation or even
damage diminishes with each passing year.
Therefore, limitation periods vary in length to
accommodate evidentiary needs. Limitation periods
also protect those who might be falsely accused from
being required to counter allegations that reach far
into the past and are impossible to disprove. A typical
limitation period for bringing suit for breach of a
written contract, for example, is four years from the
date of breach. In contrast, personal injury actions
for slander (oral defamation), must be pursued more
quickly, often within one year. The different time
limit takes into account the common sense conclusion
that recollections about unrecorded conversations are
often less reliable than written documents describing
commercial transactions.
Statutes of limitation developed long before
mental health experts began to study the dynamics of
sexual abuse. It should not be surprising that until
very recently the law did not address the unique
Statutes of limitation developed long
before mental health experts began
to study the dynamics of sexual
abuse.
circumstances of victims of childhood abuse, and the
relationship between relatively short limitation peri-
ods and the difficulty of filing a timely lawsuit.
Commentaries by therapists who regularly treat
adults still suffering the effects of childhood trauma
describe several predictable behavioral patterns that
make that difficulty understandable.
The psychic wounds that result from sexual
abuse are not easily healed. They persist into adult-
hood, and often manifest themselves in a range of
symptoms and disorders, including recurrent or long-
term depression and severe anxiety. Adult survivors
unable to escape the legacy of childhood sexual abuse
are also characterized by an inability to develop
Page 22
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socially and a wide variety of other interpersonal
problems. Because of intense feelings of shame or to
avoid consequences threatened by the abuser for
disclosing secret events, children do not report abuse
that has occurred. The process of repression and
denial may become so habitual that as years pass,
amnesia may develop.
Survivors bury childhood memories, psycho-
logically disassociating themselves from the terrify-
ing events. Conscious or not the memories remain and
while causal relationships are still unclear, victims of
sexual abuse do seem to be at heightened risk of
mental illness or substance abuse.
While mental health therapy may yield insight
into the roots of emotional pain and behavioral dys-
function, making the connection between the appar-
ent failure to develop a satisfying adult life and the
buried horror of childhood abuse can take years. Long
hidden recollections of abuse may emerge from pa-
tients in therapy well into middle age. Dealing with
the shock of newly unearthed, painful memories takes
time; gathering the courage to seek a legal remedy
takes more time yet. The impediments to disclosure
of injuries suffered by victims of child abuse were,
until very recently, not recognized in the laws of most
states. More importantly, little attention was paid to
the injustice of shielding abusers from potentially
meritorious lawsuits simply because they had waited
out limitation periods.
1990Amendments to Virginia Law
Following the lead of states such as California,
which in 1990 passed legislation dramatically extend-
ing the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse
cases," the normally conservative Virginia legislature
passed a bill in 1991 allowing lawsuits to begin a full
ten years after a victim comes of age. It explicitly
recognized the potential role of mental health profes-
sionals who assist patients to uncover memories of
past abuse. The law permitted all personal injury suits
based on sexual abuse of an underage or incompetent
person to be brought from the time
... when the fact of the injury and its
causal connection to the sexual abuse
is first communicated [to the patient]
by a licensed physician, psycholo-
gist, or clinical psychologist. How-
ever, no such action may be brought
more than ten years after the later of
(i) the last act by the same perpetrator
which was part of a common scheme
or plan of abuse or (ii) removal of the
disability of infancy or incompe-
tency.9
The effect of this amendment to existing law
was to extend the limitation period for many adults
who had endured sexual abuse as children, from a
- continued on page 39 -
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potential outside limit of two years after legal major-
ity (age twenty) to ten years -after majority (age
twenty-eight). The basic provisions were to apply
prospectively to all abuse cases. The final section of
the law created a new opportunity even for those
abuse victims whose right to sue had expired under
the former statute of limitations. Suits could be filed
for a full year after the new law went into effect
regardless of when the alleged abuse was said to have
occurred. Thus, for at least one year, any act of child
abuse committed in the past could form the basis for
litigation.
Questions for Mental Health Professionals
Even though Virginia's law was adopted by a
nearly unanimous vote, serious questions remained
about how it would be applied. For example, the
statute assumes that a "licensed physician, psycholo-
gist, or clinical psychologist" will reveal the connec-
tion between mental or emotional distress and past
sexual abuse. A communication from therapist to
patient will start the legal clock ticking. But the
language of the new statute was borrowed from
another Virginia law 1° describing delayed discovery
of asbestosis and other occupational diseases. In that
context, where the origin of internal physical injury
is rarely understood before a physician's diagnosis,
marking the starting point for a claim at the time a
diagnosis is communicated to the patient poses few
difficulties. Patients consult with their doctors, who
perform physical examinations and tests and report
their conclusions. In the mental health context, such
an approach is more problematic.
Many therapists treat patients without regard to
whether the content of the therapeutic encounter
yields legally relevant "facts" that can be discovered
and reported to the patient. They believe that patients
should go through the process of reaching psycho-
logical insights and clarifying memories with profes-
sional assistance, but they reject the idea that thera-
pists must convince patients that past trauma is
related to current distress.
Several legal questions follow from this point of
view. Would a nondirective therapist incur malprac-
tice liability for failing to explore the potential that
sexual abuse preceded pathology? Would being
unwilling to infer the occurrence of sexual abuse
from a patient's life report lead to lawsuits against
therapists? Do mental health professionals bear a
legal "duty to discover" a history of sexual abuse, and
thereby preserve timely legal claims for patients?
Designating specific professionals as the
gatekeepers of sexual abuse litigation raises other
issues. A variety of counselors and therapists work
with patients to untangle life traumas and the prob-
lems that follow. Does the new law discount insights
into childhood abuse if someone not mentioned in the
statute trips the lever of memory? Would a commu-
nication from a social worker, for example, not be
admissible to prove when the cause of action for
abuse accrued? How would a person who first
revealed details of abuse to a member of clergy fare
under the new law? What about a survivor whose
only confidant was the lawyer engaged to bring the
suit?
Finally, and apart from the concerns that were
voiced by mental health professionals, the last part of
the Virginia statute appeared to contain a fatal flaw.
It declared open season, for one year only, on anyone
who ever committed child sexual abuse. Actual
perpetrators were vulnerable to suit for one more
year; anyone else, guilty or not, was subject to
allegations destructive of family, friendships and
reputation, but about which no concrete evidence
might exist in defense. The retrospective feature of
the law threatened to reopen matters that had once
seemed officially forgotten.
Starnes v. Cayouette
With the new law in place, plaintiffs wasted no
time getting to court. Marjorie Starnes was among
the first adults to bring suit for childhood sexual
abuse. In July of 1991, she sued Robert Cayouette, 11
alleging that for nine years--from age five to four-
Page 39
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teen--she had endured multiple acts of abuse.
Cayouette, the father of Starnes' childhood best
friend, had often "threatened her with the alienation
of her family" if she revealed the abusive events. His
threats, she claimed, had caused her "to fear for her
safety." Starnes catalogued injuries that included
eating disorders, sleep disturbances, depression and
anxiety attacks. She specifically charged Cayouette
with "assault, battery, sexual battery, rape, sodomy,
false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress."
Starnes was born in 1964 and the last alleged act
of abuse occurred in 1978. She turned eighteen, the
age of majority, in 1982. Relying onthis chronology,
Cayouette responded to the allegations by invoking
the usual Virginia statute of limitations. It would
have required a claim for personal injury to be filed
within two years of legal adulthood, in this case by
1984. Starnes relied on the new Virginia law extend-
ing the limitation period for childhood sexual abuse.
The question for the trial court was whether the new
law could, consistent with the Virginia Constitution,
be applied retroactively to claims that had already
expired under the old limitation period. Regardless
of the truth of Starnes' charges, if the new law was
unconstitutional, the suit would be dismissed.
The final order of the trial court was issued in
October of 1991. That court ruled that the new law
violated state constitutional due process guarantees in
two ways. First, by extending the limitation period to
ten years, it revived some claims that had already
expired. Second, by creating a one year "window of
opportunity," it stretched the limitation period for
claims that had not yet expired, but for which the
previous limitation period had already begun to run.
Starnes' suit was dismissed, and she appealed to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Virginia's highest court analyzed the case as a
question of the defendant's rights. Did Cayouette,
upon expiration of the statute of limitations in 1984,
acquire a right that was protected by due process
guarantees of the state constitution? The court began
its review by noting that as early as 1887, Virginia had
rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling 12 (interpret-
ing the federal constitution) allowing states retroac-
tively to revive certain remedies that had already
expired under statutes of limitation. In contrast,
Virginia cases going back to 1876 had declared the
defendant's right to rely on the finality of an expired
limitation period to be a "vested right." Later Vir-
ginia cases clarified the rule that retroactive laws
were only constitutional if they did not destroy such
"vested rights."
r __ -_-
Though Starnes attempted to distinguish purely
"procedural" rights to a defense from other "substan-
tive" rights deserving of due process protection, the
court rejected the distinction. Cayouette had, a "valu-
able property right" in being free of suit, the court
declared.
The immunity from suit that arises by
operation of the statute of limitations
is as valuable a right as the right to
bring the suit itself.... If the legisla-
ture can infringe a constitutionally
protected right of one class by retroac-
tive legislation, it can infringe the
rights of every class. 3
While the provisions of the 1991 law that act
prospectively were not disturbed, on June 5,1992, the
court declared all retrospective applications of the
law unconstitutional and invalid.
Other states have reached different conclusions
in applying statutes of limitation to sex abuse cases.
Many states (twenty-one) follow the federal rule and
allow retroactive application of new limitation peri-
ods. The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the
history of its state law and concluded it was formu-
lated without concern for the issue of child sexual
abuse. Because lawmakers never considered that
social problem when they drafted statutes of limita-
tions, current law should not be applied to sexual
abuse claims, that court declared. 4 Proponents of
extended limitation periods quote the conclusion of
Page 40
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the Nevada court, which said:
To place the passage of time in a
position of priority and importance
over the plight of childhood sexual
abuse victims would seem to be the
ultimate exultation of form over sub-
stance, convenience over principle. 5
ConstitutionalAmendment
Joseph Gartlan, the state senator who sponsored
the 1991 change to Virginia's law on child sexual
abuse, announced in the wake of the Starnes decision
that he would introduce a constitutional amendment
during the next session of the Virginia General As-
sembly that would allow expired sexual abuse claims
to be revived. The proposed amendment simply
states that
[t]he General Assembly's power to
define the accrual date for an action
based on an intentional wrong shall
include the power to provide for the
retroactive application of a change in
the accrual date. No person shall have
a constitutionally protected property
right to bar a wrong on the grounds
that a change in the accrual date for
the action has been applied retroac-
tively. 6
The constitutional amendment process is quite
cumbersome. 7 It requires a majority vote in favor of
the amendment by both legislative houses, then a
second vote, taken at the next session of the legisla-
ture following a general election. If the amendment
is carried both times, it must then be submitted to
popular vote. A majority of the electorate must
approve the constitutional change.
The earliest the proposed change and the legis-
lative amendment could take effect is 1995. Despite
this additional lengthy delay, advocates for a new law
appear unfazed by their court setback. They wish to
insure that those who abuse children, and by trauma
and threats delay exposure of guilt, should not escape
judgement simply because of the passage of time.
The campaign for a new law embodies a principle
announced by ancient courts of equity: a wrongdoer
may not benefit from his own evil act. Whether that
principle can be preserved without discarding the
valuable public policies behind statutes of limitation
or providing an avenue for unmerited allegations is
a puzzle Virginia legislators will have to resolve.
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